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The neurosciences and the search
for a unified psychology: the science
and esthetics of a single framework
Henderikus J. Stam*
Department of Psychology, University of Calgary, Calgary, AB, Canada
The search for a so-called unified or integrated theory has long served as a goal for some
psychologists, even if the search is often implicit. But if the established sciences do not
have an explicitly unified set of theories, then why should psychology? After examining
this question again I argue that psychology is in fact reasonably unified around its
methods and its commitment to functional explanations, an indeterminate functionalism.
The question of the place of the neurosciences in this framework is complex. On the one
hand, the neuroscientific project will not likely renew and synthesize the disparate arms
of psychology. On the other hand, their reformulation of what it means to be human will
exert an influence in multiple ways. One way to capture that influence is to conceptualize
the brain in terms of a technology that we interact with in a manner that we do not yet
fully understand. In this way we maintain both a distance from neuro-reductionism and
refrain from committing to an unfettered subjectivity.
Keywords: unification, psychology, methodology, neurosciences, science studies
Will the Neurosciences Save Psychology or Can We Finally
Give up the Search for a Single Framework?
In The Shaking Woman novelist and essayist Siri Hustvedt (2010, p. 3) described her experience of
giving a talk in honor of her father some years after his death,
Conﬁdent and armed with index cards, I looked out at the ﬁfty or so friends and colleagues of my
father’s who had gathered around the memorial Norway spruce, launched into my ﬁrst sentence, and
began to shudder violently from the neck down. My arms ﬂapped. My knees knocked. I shook as if I
were having a seizure. Weirdly, my voice wasn’t aﬀected. It didn’t change at all. Astounded by what
was happening to me and terriﬁed that I would fall over, I managed to keep my balance and continue,
despite the fact that the cards in my hands were ﬂying back and forth in front of me. When the speech
ended, the shaking stopped.
Hustvedt (2010) describes her journey in coming to an understanding of this strange
phenomenon, aptly captured by the subtitle of the book “a history of my nerves.” Moving through
the worlds of neuroscience, psychoanalysis, psychology, psychiatry, and history, no one of them
singly ever explains her strange experience. Of course the narrative is what matters in such
accounts, the search through a contemporary knowledge of the brain and/or the mind, depending
on one’s orientation, for a solution that no discipline by itself can easily muster. Instead, it
becomes a story of how a self mysteriously aligned with a brain makes sense of unusual or diﬃcult
experiences. Such narratives are numerous; they populate not only the works of such well-known
authors as Oliver Sacks, but constitute a genre by itself—the “brain memoirs” (Tougaw, 2012).
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Variants of illness narratives, these accounts are important for
helping us understand the explosion of science as well as its limits.
For if there were a straightforward neurobiological explanation
there would be less of a detective story to tell and we would have
more of a straightforward illness narrative instead.
What these narratives provide by way of a subplot is the failure
of the mind/brain sciences to understand the complexities of the
non-representative and non-standard case. But for authors, such
as Hustvedt, who have immersed themselves in the philosophy
and science of the brain, there is a keen awareness of the various
sciences grappling with its subject matter. Such brain memoirs
make fascinating reading not only for the overlapping questions
of a self and its brain, but of the sciences of those selves and
brains that are forever tripping over themselves to make the
necessary connections between that self and that brain. And there
are those who are now quite conﬁdent that the solution to all
such mysteries lies in these brain sciences. Indeed, once remote
and inaccessible, it now appears to certain authors, psychologists,
and neuroscientists (Churchland, 2007) that the brain will soon
integrate the various elements of psychology into a coherent
science—ﬁnally a dream come true, one that has been articulated
from the time of Julien de La Mettrie through to Karl Pribram
and Antonio Damasio, and perhaps evenNikolas Rose. If we have
seen this optimism before, it is likely because other projects were
announced with equal optimism– behaviorism, cognitivism, and
evolutionary psychology to name but a few. However, before I
address these claims, I wish to ask instead what previous attempts
at a grand synthesis have left us, and howmuch faith one ought to
place in such attempts, for it is faith indeed that is required. Then
I would like to dispel any entirely negative case by noting that
certain kinds of synthetic frames can’t help but emerge from the
neurosciences. The task is not to reject them but to understand
and utilize those frames as appropriate tools.
Modern Synthesis?
The possible options that qualify for a “modern synthesis1” seem
more numerous today than even 30 years ago, when a version of
evolutionary theory in its infancy, was one candidate. Psychology
was largely dominated by a representationist and computational
science of cognition. Do any of these, once hailed as revolutionary
options, come close to providing us with a synthesis? This is a
question that cannot be answered to any degree of satisfaction
and we are far too early in the game to come to such a conclusion.
It will be helpful, however, to consider other recent attempts to
“unify” psychology. These will be useful for judging the adequacy
of any particular attempt at “synthesis” be it neuroscientiﬁc or
otherwise.
Let me make a simple claim at the outset. Historically sciences
have ‘synthesized’, if at all, or become more or less integrated
when they have found a problem or set of problems that promised
resolution around some conceptual–methodological framework.
1The phrase “modern synthesis” is of course a reference to a term coined by Huxley
(1942) who along with numerous others combined genetics with population
biology to create the conditions for this synthesis. I am using it here in this sense,
the uniﬁcation of disparate elements into a single uniﬁed framework or theory.
Newton’s Principia is the token example and became a model
for all subsequent attempts to resolve the question of just what
a science ought to do to build a coherent framework. The many
“Newtons” in natural philosophy who attempted to bring some
rapprochement to the question of mind (think Kant and Hume,
for example) only solidiﬁed this goal of a uniﬁed, mathematized
vision of a science to which all should aspire. The messier
biological sciences were never taken to be an aspirational model,
although the modern synthesis in biology that united population
biology with Mendelian genetics in the ﬁrst half of the 20th
century comes a close second (Mayr, 1942).
Nonetheless, it should be obvious that even after such
uniﬁcations or syntheses the sciences in question did not fall into
line. Physicists continued to argue, as did chemists and other
practitioners of the new sciences in the 19th century. Hence,
a synthesis was often a broad framework or set of problems
that provided the necessary grounding for groups of scholars
and scientists to proceed with the work of clearing the ground
for further research. In the Kuhnian tradition, this came to
be known as “normal science”, that is the science that carries
on solving puzzles that might remain while some set of larger
questions have been acceptably resolved (Kuhn, 1962/1996). So-
called “revolutions” according to Kuhn (1962/1996) were major
breakthroughs in the way in which science constituted its subject
matter. Although Kuhn’s (1962/1996) version of this has in
retrospect appeared overly simplistic and has been thoroughly
debated, the question remains of just how major shifts in science
occur and if they are at all predictable. For example, Mendeleev’s
contributions to the table of elements not only appeared to
“unify” chemistry but created the framework for discovering
other elements that were not yet included in the table and would
continue to be added to it—as they actually were as recently as
only a few years ago. But not everyone is happy with the table of
elements, for example earth scientists have found the traditional
table to be quite limited in its applicability to geochemistry,
mineralogy, aqueous chemistry, and related sciences. Hence
these sciences have structured the table quite diﬀerently, often
repeating elements and organizing these by charge (Railsback,
2003). In short, while working out of a “synthesis” such a
synthesis is never totalizing, or complete. It shapes the established
sciences by framing a broad consensus but any aspect of that
consensus could break open at a moment’s notice under the right
conditions.
It is obvious that the human sciences have never had such
a stable framework. One might argue that the very idea of
a human science, and a science of psychology in particular,
was made possible by virtue of its ability to ignore much of
what was relevant and important to human subjectivity by
focusing, as Wundt originally had it, on the most simpliﬁed
forms of human activity in the realm of perception and sensation.
Already in the late 19th century the German debate about
the relative importance of verstehen vs. erklären indicated a
deep divide between what would inform, in part, a distinction
between the human and natural sciences. Can one ever explain
primary experience, consciousness and the like or are we,
as participants in the phenomena we wish to explain always
laboring on the margins of what is better understood from
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the ﬁrst person perspective? When Snow (1959) turned his
Rede lecture into an inﬂuential book (The two cultures and the
scientific revolution), the divide between what we may call two
fundamental forms knowing was considerable2. Psychology has
continually attempted to straddle that divide, with occasional
successes but largely with an inability to address the interpretive
nature of human subjectivity at the expense of ﬁnely honed
studies that address questions manageable or manufactured in
the laboratory (Gergen, 1973; Robinson, 1985; Stam, 2012).
Every major development in the history of 20th century
psychology has sold itself as a complete psychology. From
behaviorism to evolutionary psychology through cognitive
science and its multiple variants, the promulgation of a vast new
theoretical framework was often accompanied by broad claims
for its ability to be an absolute psychology. The failure of these
projects was sometimes grand, as in the case of behaviorism,
but often took the form of a disappointment that slowly led
to the abandonment of whatever research models and projects
were at hand. Business as usual in psychology was a “business”
of determining just what constituted the phenomenon under
investigation. This led to debates about intellectual territory,
ideas, but most often, practices. For it was in the practice of
psychology that the greatest advancement was to be found,
the technologies of testing, behavior modiﬁcation, therapy,
counseling, personnel selection, and so on. These practices
made enduring inroads into public acceptance and gradually
managed to convince contemporary liberal democracies that
psychology was an important if not always exact science that
had much to oﬀer in the form of technologies of classiﬁcation,
theories that focused on individuals as sources for problems
of living, and general forms of practice the ﬁt well with
industrial and post-industrial societies. Hence while academic
and research psychologists continued their long argument,
applied psychologists got down to business and took care of
their charges in clinics, schools, factories, oﬃces, government,
and elsewhere (Leary, 1987). It is not surprising then that
contributions to theory were sometimes the outcome of broader
changes in applied areas (e.g., the advances in statistical tools
and interpretations derived from them that originated in applied
ﬁelds of testing). This while psychologists in charge of the
training of neophytes in the academies could not agree exactly
on the nature of their science, nor on the precise mechanisms of
intervention in the world.
This history is well known and I have merely given a brief
summary here (Bühler, 1927; Vygotsky, 1927/1987; Koch, 1959–
1963). But it has meant that from time to time there have been
attempts to “unify” psychology under some banner or other so
that, at the very least, the stories told to the public by both
academics and practitioners would match. The claim is that
psychology is not uniﬁed and this hurts both its practitioners and
its status as a science (Staats, 1991; Henriques, 2008)3. A quick
2It was Koch (1964) who noted in a rather wistful manner that psychology seemed
entirely untouched by the debate unleashed by Snow’s (1959) thesis of the divide
between the humanities and the sciences.
3It should be noted that there are very straightforward claims to the contrary,
namely, in favor of something like explanatory pluralism of the sort expressed by
Dale et al. (2009).
and simplistic comparison is then drawnwith the natural sciences
wherein physics is taken to be exemplary but even biology will do
as a standard. This is then contrasted to psychology’s squabbles
and the lack of a consensus on the status of just what is scientiﬁc
and what counts as pseudo-science and, goes the argument,
it is high time to clean up the mess. Some one or another
scheme is then proﬀered for replacingmany small but recalcitrant
theories in the discipline and this over-riding scheme is usually
packaged as superior because of its ability to unite, provide a
foundation, or otherwise cohere the many strands that make up
the contemporary discipline.
Although not numerous, such schemes usually include a
list of reasons why this is a problem or why psychology is a
“disuniﬁed science” in Staats’s (1991) words. After some broad
generalizations, lumping all areas of psychology together, a wide
variety of propositions or arguments have been put forth to
unify the discipline. In Staats’s (1994) case, this was a “uniﬁed
positivism” or a “psychological behaviorism” depending on
what phase of Staats’s career one is reading. Ultimately it was
an attempt to fuse multiple areas and features of psychology
into a single “uniﬁed science.” Others of more recent vintage
have attempted to keep these projects alive, or at least to put
their personal stamp on such a project for every uniﬁcation
project seems to require that its proponent think through the
problem anew. In recent years, Sternberg and Grigorenko (2001),
Goertzen (2008) and Henriques (2008) among many others have
continued to write on these questions, providing variations on the
problem (is there a “crisis” of uniﬁcation?) and oﬀering numerous
solutions (e.g., the “tree of knowledge,”—Henriques, a “uniﬁed
psychology approach”—Sternberg), and so on (see Stam, 2004 for
one critique).
The problems with these projects are (i) they are not responses
to genuine problems in psychology but an attempt to impose
order on disorder from an abstract vantage point, (ii) their
relationship to empirical research is thin, and (iii) they rarely
amount to more than a singular project or a personal vision
of some abstract structures and/or institutional and political
processes that might solve the so-called “crisis of disuniﬁcation”
(Green, 2015). But all of these, it is important to note, have also
been proposed at a high level of abstraction without solving any
particular, single, concrete problem in the discipline. Indeed what
characterizes such projects is their considerable remove from the
world of minute, everyday psychological phenomena.
To understand the way in which a modern synthesis might
work it is important to understand ﬁrst how it will not work. It
is quite clear that all attempts at uniﬁcation have been failures
for multiple reasons. First, no serious science has ever been
“uniﬁed” (assuming we actually know what this means), by a
de facto decree. The history of science, however, is replete with
examples, as noted above, of sciences that have coalesced around
real problems that were genuinely altered by new methods,
techniques, and theories that slowly—or quite suddenly—opened
up new ways of examining traditionally recalcitrant problems.
The closest to the sciences of the mind that might be relevant
for all future investigations of syntheses is biology. It found
its professional voice in the 19th century following the gradual
acceptance of Darwin’s theory of natural selection and then found
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newmomentum in the 20th with, as noted, the modern synthesis,
or the combined forces of population biology and genetics which
supported a broad understanding of evolution (Mayr, 1942).
Nonetheless, in biology uniﬁcation is still far oﬀ even if this
has not prevented certain strategies of integration (Mitchell
and Dietrich, 2006). This distinction between uniﬁcation and
integration is useful for the integration is based on actual
empirical problems and examples, whereas uniﬁcation is often an
abstract proposal imposed from above. As Mitchell and Dietrich
(2006, p. S78) note,
There are multiple mechanical triggers for behavior for a complex
system. Which ones are present and active may well be a function
of the ecological context in which the system is located. Explaining
complex, evolved biological systems is not a “one-size- ﬁts-all”
enterprise.
In comparison, psychology has more or less shifted
from one project to another, never entirely abandoning
what went before but attempting each time to begin again
on a new footing. Behaviorism incorporated elements of
functionalism just as the new cognitive psychology adopted
elements of Hullian behaviorism. These were always partial
appropriations, and rhetorically behaviorism diﬀerentiated itself
from functionalism just as cognitive psychology diﬀerentiated
itself from behaviorism. Nevertheless, these breaks were never
quite as clear as they appeared on the surface. However, more to
the point, as Koch (1971, pp. 690–691) noted, “as for the subject
matter of psychology, it is diﬃcult to see how it could ever have
been thought to be a coherent one under any deﬁnition of the
presumptive ‘science,’ whether in terms of mind, consciousness,
experience, behavior, or, indeed,molecule aggregates or transistor
circuits”. Forgotten in all of this too is that there is no longer any
center to the discipline of psychology, if there in fact ever was. To
quote Koch (1971, p. 695) again, who proposed,
that the essential non-cohesiveness of the activities denoted by
the term “psychology” be acknowledged by replacing it with
some locution as “the psychological studies.” Students should
no longer be tricked by a terminological rhetoric into the
belief that they are studying a single discipline or any set of
specialties rendered coherent by any actual or potential principle
of coherence.The current “departments of psychology” should be
called “departments of psychological studies”.
Unified After All?
Despite this seeming disarray and ‘disunity’ of the discipline
called psychology, there are in fact features that artiﬁcially but
successfully have held the discipline together for more than half
a century. For despite all the calls of crisis, psychology has been
hugely successful if one only counts the number of psychologists
plying their trade in such diverse domains as the classroom, the
clinic, the workplace, and a multitude of laboratories around
the world. As sociologists of the professions note, to be a
successful discipline requires ﬁrst, that one have a marketplace
within which one can disseminate symbolic capital, second, an
acceptable manner of producing knowledge, and third, a system
of training to reproduce members of the discipline (Freidson,
1986). Psychology has had all three in abundance, and hence
continues to thrive. But it is not enough to produce a stable
discipline for, after all, phrenology also had all three but is no
longer in evidence despite its immense popularity in the 19th
century. We must look further then for the roots of this stability.
The other deeply rooted features of psychology that are easily
reproduced even in such cases where no two psychologists agree
on a fundamental framework are (i) psychology’s methods and
(ii) its functional interpretation of just about any and all of its
conceptual elements (Stam, 2004). The ﬁrst is obvious, the second
is much more subtle.
First, methods have become remarkably stable in the face of
continuing disagreements and debates about the subject matter of
psychology. It is as if, by tacit agreement, psychologists have come
to realize that methodology is what holds their discipline together
in the absence of any agreed upon frames of reference, common
vocabulary or shared theoretical understandings (sometimes
referred to, at least since Gordon Allport, asmethodolatry). These
methods include not only the common variety of methods taught
in our universities, such as those associated with experimentation
and quasi-experimentation but also include the statistical tools
that are symbiotic with these methods, such as the analysis of
variance in all its forms, regression models in its linear and non-
linear forms, and also the multiple ways of producing items for
such tools as psychometric instruments. More recently it has
come to include, slowly but surely, the new forms of qualitative
analyses and research, such as discourse analysis, grounded
theory and so on. That this constitutes a common vocabulary
of sorts for much of psychology is readily appreciable when one
considers that the one feature psychologists from diverse ﬁelds
hold in common is their common educational history in methods
classes. They may not understand what their colleagues are up
to but they can still critique their faulty use of a regression
analysis!
Second, the general use of functional accounts (what I have
called indeterminate functionalism; Stam, 2006, 2015), which
have impregnated almost all forms of psychological work and
theorizing, has rarely been the subject of much discussion.
Without them, however, it is hard to imagine how psychology
would continue to reproduce itself. This is much less obvious
nor as readily acknowledged among the halls of academe or
in the clinics or workshops of the psychologist. A functional
vocabulary refers to the notion that we are primarily interested
in the functional properties of whatever it is we are investigating,
treating, predicting, or otherwise describing. This is as true
for behavioral, neuropsychological, cognitive, developmental,
school, social, and whatever other areas of psychology that make
up the contemporary discipline (it is not, however, universally
true, there are exceptions). The point is that when we describe,
say, a memory as a research object we do not have a material
object in mind. We mean by a memory a kind of activity
that is speciﬁed in research or practice as a recallable item of
some sort that was either learned as part of an experiment or
that involves some restricted or constrained recall of personal
knowledge or events. But there are no objects called “explicit
memory,” “short-term memory,” “procedural memory,” and so
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on in the way that we have, for example, mitochondria, or
aminoglycosides or even something as complex as particles in
linear accelerators that are only hypothesized to exist4. Our
functional vocabulary identiﬁes a psychological object by virtue
of its existence as a function of some set of activities. This
is as true for broad categories of psychological objects as
for more delimited ones such as episodic memory. Think of
extraversion, which is a standard component of many personality
scales and has been for at least 60 years. We determine that
someone is extraverted not from their conversational skills or
their unwillingness to stand up and speak in public, but from
their avowal or disavowal of items on a standardized personality
inventory such as “I talk to a lot of diﬀerent people at parties5.”
In the act of agreeing with such items we come to recognize
the object “extraversion” and assign it to individuals as an
aggregate score whose value lies in its status as a normative
score on some dimension, that is, a score that then allows us to
compare this person to others who have responded to the same
questions.
Thus far this is rather mundane if not obvious to students
of psychology. How could it be otherwise one might ask?
Well, various attempts have been made to provide more certain
foundations for the choice of psychological objects, either in
the form of a serious materialist reductive program, a radical
behaviorist program or certain versions of cognitive psychology.
Wouldn’t it be more stable if all psychologists ceased relying on
any “verbal report” and instead chose to rely strictly on behavioral
indices. Unfortunately the history of behaviorism has shown us
that “behavior” is equally interpreted. When does a movement
constitute behavior? How do we distinguish aggressive behavior
from nurturing behavior except through a series of interpretive
functional accounts we create in research studies. Suﬃce it to
say that the vast majority of psychological theorizing takes place
in the form of a functionalist framework, carrying on a long
tradition that has its origins in 19th century physiology. On that
score Wundt was certainly original insofar as he was able to
bend the vagaries of certain psychological properties to his will by
subjecting them to an experimental investigation and a functional
account.
There is an obvious beneﬁt to the way in which functional
accounts are structured: the inherent ﬂexibility of such
accounts makes it possible to rapidly expand one’s theoretical
armamentarium. For example, there are several hundred
diﬀerent kinds of memory (Tulving, 2007), dozens of types
of personality scales with diﬀerent numbers of not items but
factors, innumerable variables under investigation in social
psychology such that researchers have specialized in a few
in their limited domain since no one can possibly grasp the
whole, and so on. I can do a study on psychological factor
x and decide legitimately that x is really not one but two
factors, so I create x′ and y′. Someone else continues in this
research and adds another variable to this conﬁguration that is
4I am grateful to a reviewer who noted that diﬀerent memory systems have been
proposed for very diﬀerent purposes. These systems do not always compare easily
and hence lack an overarching framework.
5This is a hypothetical example.
presumably responsible for both x′ and y′, and calls it z′′. And
before long we have not just a diﬀerence between episodic and
semantic memory but also a distinction between declarative and
procedural memory, explicit and implicit memory, short-term
and long-term memory, and so on. Not that memory researchers
start out with a single system and branch out, but that given
any kind of memory, it is not diﬃcult to reﬁne and distinguish
another memory based on variations in procedures used to elicit
the memory.
It should be obvious that the inherent ﬂexibility in identifying
new functions that can be created in a research settings and
then named as part of some functional account is not just
important for its ﬂexibility but is a process that can be carried on
indeﬁnitely.
There is no in principle limit to the kinds and number of
functional ascriptions possible. Note that this is not a statement
about the limits of science. There is also no in principle limit
to the kinds and number of elements in the periodic table of
elements. However, there is both a theoretical limit and an
empirical constraint on just how large such a table can be
despite the many additions to the table since Mendeleev’s time.
In psychology, the empirical constraints are missing, one can
always devise a new procedure in one’s research that will bring
the new function into existence. One can devise, for example, a
new memory task that will allow for the demonstration of a new
form of remembering.
And the procedure of expanding the kinds of memories that
exist would simply move forward. In that case we cannot speak
of ‘empirical adequacy’ as it is sometimes used to describe a
key characteristic of science. For the empirical procedure that
calls the function into existence (e.g., episodic memory for
events and experiences) is the same as the criterion of empirical
adequacy, which demonstrates the fact of episodic memory.
We are caught in a vicious circle since we have no ontological
a priori.
It is generally assumed that functional accounts keep from
slipping into dualism by virtue of their appeal to a series of
promissory notes whose claim is that, eventually, a truly reductive
account will reveal all. And memory researchers have, of course,
provided numerous neurological candidates for various memory
models (Eichenbaum and Cohen, 2004; Aggleton and Brown,
2006; Cohen, 2015). Hence, indeterminate functionalism could
be made more determinate by ﬁxing certain categories to
neurological structures. This is after all one aim of cognitive
neuroscience. It should be noted, however, that even when
‘ﬁxed’ in this manner functional categories remain ambivalently
indeterminate by virtue of the fact that they exist as procedures,
not as objects.
In short, between our methods and our functional
vocabularies and explanatory strategies, psychology is much
more uniﬁed than seems the case on the surface. But it is also
relatively incoherent; since that is what I think is often meant
by “disuniﬁed.” The incoherence is the direct outcome of a lack
of agreement on just what psychological objects are and how
we might deﬁne them. Our functional strategies allow us to
deﬁne new variables ad inﬁnitum. Psychology appears to be all
epistemology without a clear ontology.
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Applied Psychology: Applications of a
Science?
Although this may seem a diﬀerent question altogether, one
driver of the ﬂexible research programs that psychology
promulgates has been the rather lopsided relationship between
researchers and practitioners. The vast majority of psychologists
currently active in the world work as practitioners. This
means that they could be anything from clinical psychologists,
counseling psychologists, educational psychologists, personnel
psychologists, military psychologists, industrial psychologists, or
a host of other applied professional psychologists working in
varied settings. Numbers here are dubious, given that no one
body is responsible for, or concerns itself with, tracking exact
global numbers for professions. However, given that at least a
quarter of psychologists in the world live and work in the US
(about 160,200 by last count, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014), the
vast majority (up to 90%) is estimated to be engaged in clinical,
counseling or school activities or in health service provider and
industrial–organizational activities.
These numbers generally reﬂect trends in the North Atlantic
regions and demonstrate that psychologists who dominate the
discipline are little concerned about the arcane features of
academic debates that interest those in universities and research-
only settings. It should be clear that practicing psychologists
receive their education in universities but are generally not
beholden to such principles as promised by a “scientist
practitioner” model or the more recent minority view, the
“clinical scientist” model. The question then is, can there ever
be a genuine intellectual revolution that will provide a kind of
synthesis for this wide range of activities. Koch thought it was
an impossible task since there was no single discipline to unify. I
wish to enquire what the neurosciences might oﬀer.
The Neuroscientific Synthesis
The spectacular advances in imaging techniques made possible
by not only the reﬁnement of electroencephalography (EEG)
measures but by the addition of positron emission tomography
(PET), computerized tomography (CT), optical tomography and
functional magnetic resonance imaging (FMRI) scans has greatly
advanced the “visibility” of brain processes even though each
of these techniques are dependent on sophisticated statistical
and constructive mathematical and computerized processes.
These have gone with equally swift advances in research in the
neurosciences, but as numerous “neuroskeptics” have pointed
out (eg., Boekel et al., 2015), the science is hardly optimal and
replications often fail. We are a long way from understanding
just what the brain does and how it does it, but there is a
general optimism that the neurosciences will save psychology and
psychiatry from the repeated adoption of fad-like theories that
are typically discarded after one or two generations (Bickle, 2003;
Caruso, 2012; Reardon, 2014; but see Machamer and Sytsma,
2007). That optimism notwithstanding, the neurosciences indeed
are a formidable interdisciplinary, multipronged and richly
funded matrix of research, tools, and practices whose imagery
creates at least the appearance of a science slowly but surely
removing the veils of ignorance that have kept us from
understanding ourselves.
And asWittgenstein noted in a diﬀerent context, it is just such
an image that can hold us captive.
The question here is to what degree can the neuroscientiﬁc
project renew and synthesize the disparate arms of psychology?
Although popular books and articles appear at a steady rate, we
are far too early in the game to provide any kind of answer to
this question. What the neurosciences are unlikely to do is mimic
their colleagues in evolutionary psychology, which has gone
through a rather marked decline in the past decade. Following the
revival of sociobiology under the guise of a modular evolutionary
psychology (Tooby and Cosmides, 2005), it promised to be the
new model for a revived integrated psychology. That this has not
happened is due to many features of this new approach, not least
of which is the rerun of similar issues that bedeviled sociobiology.
Mostly, however, evolutionary psychologists relied heavily on
the language of genetics to provide the justiﬁcation for their
hypotheses. Genuine genetic analyses were remarkably absent,
however, from the work of evolutionary psychology (Dagg, 2005)
and the recent science of epigenetics has made problematic
much of evolutionary psychology’s claims [for a deﬁnition of
epigenetics see Berger et al. (2009)]. As is the case for most
theories, adjustments can and will be made to save the theory,
however, it’s simplicity and purported broad applicability will
suﬀer as a consequence.
Critics have worried that the neurosciences are either
reductionist in their intent, with all of the problems that follow
from this (Choudhury and Slaby, 2012), or they are subject
to the mereological fallacy in which powers and activities are
attributed to brains or parts of brains when these are normally
ascribed to persons as a whole (cf. Bennett and Hacker, 2003;
Gergen, 2010). Such critiques have their place, for surely much
neuroscience is reductionist in intent. And the reductive language
cannot help but fail to replace a language of meaning and
intent. That is, a reductionist neuroscientiﬁc language cannot
replace the reporting role of ordinary language, the language
of intentions, semantics, and sentience. If it could, it would
have to be as contextually sensitive as ordinary language and we
would be back to where we began. However, reductive strategies
for certain purposes are not only useful, as for example, in
locating and treating disorders that may have their origin in the
brain, but also for understanding the structure, function and
neuropharmacological properties of brains.
Other critics have noted the limitations of neural processes
in explaining complex social activities. For example, Coey et al.
(2012) have noted that understanding the context of social
interactions requires understanding their “embodied-embedded”
constraints. These authors argue that the organization of human
behavior, particularly its self-organizing processes, requires
something much more dynamic than a neural account.
Given these limitations there will always be doubts about
the overall “synthesizing” potential of the neurosciences. It
would be a mistake, however, to dismiss the impact of the
neurosciences on psychology and the shift that it will force
on the discipline in the coming years. I take here as telling
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that Nikolas Rose is ambivalent since he is generally a critic of
psychology and all “psy” disciplines, that is, those disciplines that
are engaged in processes that he argues are invoked in practices
of “governmentality” after Foucault, that refer in particular to
the creation of subjectivities through the organized practices
of a society. But, according to Rose and Abi-Rached (2013,
p. 21), “despite their apparent contradictions, neurobiological
research emphasizing the role of non-conscious neural processes
and habits in our decisions and actions can-and does—happily
coexist with longstanding ideas about choice, responsibility, and
consciousness that are so crucial to contemporary advanced
liberal societies.” That is, neuroscience has not removed from
us our responsibility to be actors whose fates are not captured
only by processes that occur outside awareness in our brains, but
also has not lessened the requirement that we govern those forces
through an endless process of self-discipline. Despite the fact that
the neurosciences constitute “psy” disciplinarity by other means,
it should be obvious argue Rose andAbi-Rached (2013, p. 21) that
“human brains are both shaped by, and shape, their sociality”.
What this leads to is a discourse (my term) of neuroscience
that will ultimately move beyond a neuro-reductive language to
one that will address “questions of complexity and emergence,
and to locate neural processes ﬁrmly in the dimensions of time,
development, and transactions within a milieu” (Rose and Abi-
Rached, 2013, p. 23). In other words, the picture of our brain as
plastic and ultimately social is a revisionist one that can be used
for multiple ends.
In a related vein both Moore (2006) and Derksen (2011) have
urged an alternative view of brains and evolution. Moore argued
that it is more productive to think of evolutionary psychology as
the outcome of the design and production of technical systems
rather than engineered mechanisms. Its originality lies in its
amalgamation of so-called standard adaptationist accounts of
evolution with those that are interactionist and typically critical
of adaptationist accounts. It hinges on a conception of technology
as a set of social relations, leading to an evolutionary psychology
that can account for the emergence of mindedness and sociality
(Moore, 2006). Taking the argument of biology as technology
seriously, Derksen (2011, p. 844) notes along with Andy Clark
that “A technological conception of the brain leads away from
neuro-reductionism rather than toward it, as long as one keeps
an eye on the relational nature of the mechanisms that make up
the mind, and one is willing to see the extension of the mind
beyond the ‘skinbag’ into a growing network of tools” . The brain-
as-instrument is an unusual reconceptualization argues Derksen
(2011) because we are both identiﬁed with our brains and treat it
as something external to us. The brain as instrument is an attempt
to steer between a version of personhood that makes us neither
the passive bystanders of what happens in “our brain” nor does it
make us able to ‘use’ the brain just as we will.
Perhaps a return to one of Latour’s (2004) formulations might
help here. Using the example of developing a “nose” for perfume
he argues that what matters in learning to diﬀerentiate among
many odors is the ability to articulate diﬀerent odors after lengthy
practice. It is not a question, for Latour, of determining the exact,
precise chemical foundation of an odor, that is, to develop an
accuracy of reference. As Latour (2004, pp. 210–211) argues, “the
decisive advantage of articulation over accuracy of reference is
that there is no end to articulation whereas there is an end to
accuracy.”
Transposed to the brain sciences, what a technological
conception provides us with is an ever greater possibility of
articulation of just what the brain is capable of, how it makes
a diﬀerence in life, what it allows us to do, and so on,
without having to immediately decide that one is being neuro-
reductionist or that one must defend against such a stance.
Instead, brains, like eyes, ears, and noses, make articulations
possible in ways we have not fully realized. Again, in the words
of Latour (2004, p. 226), “It is not a ﬁght against reductionism
nor a plea for the whole personal, subjective body that should
be respected instead of being ‘cut into pieces’.” Reductionism
is on his account, simply an impossibility, just as having no
body is an impossibility. So rather than creating a sharp division
between reductionist science on the one hand and a militant
subjectivity on the other, the question of the body (and the brain)
is one of articulating the multiple possibilities and positions
that emerge from the new sciences, not to determine where
the objective body ends and the subjective body begins (see the
program for a neurophenomenology as one attempt to develop
research methods appropriate to a slightly alternative strategy,
e.g., Olivares et al., 2015).
What this position attempts to do is to escape from the Scylla
of reductionism and the Charybdis of subjectivity. Must we, with
Metzinger (2009) who, in echoing Julien Oﬀray de La Mettrie’s
L’homme machine, proclaims that there is no self argue that
we can never solve the problem of consciousness? Or must we
privilege a stubborn subjectivity? What a technology or, perhaps
better said, a techno-science position claims for the brain is
nothing less than all there is to know about the brain. But all
there is to know is not the end of the story, for what we come
to know elides in multiple ways with the social world and is taken
up as a problem for subjectivity. As a consequence we articulate,
in Latour’s sense, the world diﬀerently. Just as people articulated
the world diﬀerently after discovering that a heart was better
thought of as a sophisticated pump. Or when it was discovered
that electromagnetic radiation of very short wavelengths could
penetrate matter to become what we now refer to as X-rays,
this knowledge and everything it has revealed to us about the
human body has been integrated into our practical knowledge
of ourselves. When an X-ray of our broken wrist is displayed,
we understand that this too is a part of us—both as object and
as problem. As a technology it is both distancing and revealing.
It looks like something other than us, while we recognize that it
also reveals who we are and is made possible by a vast network
of medical practice that has shaped bodily existence in the 20th
century and beyond.
The brain-as-technology question is compounded, however, if
not confounded, by reﬂexivity. Brains are not only technology,
they are us and at the same time they are not us (Dotov
et al., 2010). Hence how the brain sciences become integrated
into contemporary medical, psychological (‘psy’ disciplines), and
social disciplines and practices will reveal and depend on the
interests of multiple actors and interests. What they won’t do is
become the unifying theoretical ediﬁce that psychologists have
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dreamt of for so long. However, they can open up not only new
avenues for inquiry but also reveal new ways of being human.
These new ways will not just supplant our older forms of self-
understanding but will likely become integrated into what we
already know ourselves to be. Just as psychoanalysis did not
destroy the western conception of personhood, it did open up
alternative questions, modes of thinking, and moral frameworks
that had not been obvious or present before psychoanalysis. Once
psychoanalysis had become deeply embedded in contemporary
culture there was no way back to a late-19th century view of
mind and human nature, at least not for the citizen of the
modern, that is, post-WWI western world. Psychoanalysis grew
up with and has become ensnared in industrialized societies and
as these societies shifted to broadly post-industrial, globalized
forms of neo-liberalism the explanatory forms of psychoanalysis
were unable to sustain the versions of personhood emerging.
As the neurosciences feed into our contemporary versions of
fragmented personhood, they too will elaborate, diﬀerentiate
and contribute to renewed models of persons. Indeed, even
psychoanalysis has become neuropsychoanalysis (Solms and
Turnbull, 2011).
Perhaps the law can serve as an illustration. Neuroscience,
like any science potentially, can aﬀect legal cases wherever that
science is relevant. But neuroscience has a unique role in so
far as it will lead the legal system to question key notions
of responsibility that are central to determinations of guilt or
innocence. As Greene and Cohen (2004, p. 1775) argue,
. . .. . .neuroscience will probably have a transformative eﬀect
on the law, despite the fact that existing legal doctrine can,
in principle, accommodate whatever neuroscience will tell us.
New neuroscience will change the law, not by undermining
its current assumptions, but by transforming people’s moral
intuitions about free will and responsibility. This change in
moral outlook will result not from the discovery of crucial new
facts or clever new arguments, but from a new appreciation of
old arguments, bolstered by vivid new illustrations provided by
cognitive neuroscience.
In the same way, psychology can accommodate “whatever
neuroscience will tell us” but it aﬀects so many aspects of what
it is to be human that we will undoubtedly shift our conceptions
of ourselves in the process. And it may be just around those moral
intuitions that we will be most likely to shift.
Hustvedt (2010), in seeking an answer to her strange episode
of shaking, scoured multiple disciplines and medical practices
for an account of her aﬄiction. The fact that no single one
could provide her with a satisfactory account indicates just how,
without rejecting a notion of something like a brain disease, it
is a hopelessly incomplete explanation. It appeared to her, after
the fact, as more of a “conversion disorder,” but this too was
unsatisfactory. And so the brain sciences, as they reshape how
we view, manipulate, understand and investigate brains will also
reshape our explanatory categories, but in ways we are unlikely
to foresee. Hustvedt’s (2010) account is so compelling because we
can see the incomplete nature of the neurosciences just as that
science grapples with a condition like the one Hustvedt (2010)
described. And she recognizes that the condition is neither solely
organic nor conscious/unconscious. It is both and neither, and we
are in transition.
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